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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION
During the pendency of a motion for a new trial in a
forcible detainer suit, a newspaper published certain articles
and news stories, dealing with the conduct of the trial.1 Among
other things, the paper reported, with obvious approval, the
circulation of petitions demanding that the judge grant a
motion for a new trial, and that he refuse to preside at it.-2
For the publication of these materials, petitioners, editor,
publisher, and a reporter of the paper, were summarily fined
and committed to jail for contempt. They alleged that the
conviction was a direct violation of the freedom of the press,
and applied for a writ of habeas corpus. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court held, reversing the decision of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeas, 8 that the conviction for contempt was
erroneous, there being no "clear and present danger" of an
interference with the administration of justice. Craig V.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). (Frankfurter, J., Vinson, C.
J., and Jackson, J., dissenting.)
In cases concerning convictions for contempt by publi-
cation, i.e., for the printing and circulation, outside the con-
fines of the court, of materials interfering with the orderly
administration of justice in a pending case--so often char-
acterized as "trial by newspaper"-two of the most cherished
1. The county judge who presided held office under elective tenure,
and was not a lawyer. The jury twice refused to follow his direc-
tions for a verdict, and upon the third direction, brought in a ver-
dict for the defendant, with the attached notation that they did so
under the coercion of the court and against their consciences,
counsel for the defendant having informed them that no purpose
would be served by their continued recalcitrance. Defendant then
moved for a new trial. It was during the pendency of action upon
this motion that the allegedly contemptuous publications were made.
2. The following samples of the published material are among those
quoted in the opinion of the Court: "Browning's (the judge's) be-
havior and attitude has brought down the wrath of public opinion
upon his head, properly so. Emotions have been aggravated.
American people simply don't like the idea of such goings on,
especially when a man in the service of his country seems to be
getting a raw deal. * * *
"It is difficult to believe that any lawyer, even a hack, would
have followed such high handed procedure in instructing a jury.
It's no wonder that the jury balked and public opinion is outraged."
The reports further characterized the entire conduct of the
trial as a 'travesty on justice."
3, Ex parte Craig, 193 S.W,2d 178 (Texas, 1946).
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concepts of American legal tradition collide head-on.' Though
the courts are wont to say that the conflict between freedom
of the press and the iight to an impartial and uninfluenced
trial may be resolved without either giving way to the other,5
it is difficult to see how such a result can be achieved. 6 The
problem is rather which is the paramount civil right, not one
of reconciliation of the two. In the instant case, the Court
re-examined and reaffirmed its ruling in Bridges v. Califo'-
nia,7 again refusing to allow summary punishment for con-
tempt by publication in the absence of a showing that the
published material presented a "clear and present danger"
to the administration of justice.8
The problem is quantitative, in two respects. The first
quantitative aspect involves the determination of just how far
a newspaper can go before a "clear and present danger" to
the administration of justice is presented. Certainly the facts
of the present case show a clear attempt to influence the out-
come of the litigation by thinly-veiled threats of political re-
prisals against the judge. The majority admits the existence
of the power to punish contempts summarily, in the case of a
"clear and present danger" or where "the substantive evil is
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
4. A second type of contempt by publication involves the printing of
material which "scandalizes the court" or offers an affront to its
dignity. It will not be treated further in this discussion, since
the case does not involve the point.
5. See, e.g., Black, J., in Bridges v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252, 260, holding
that that case does not raise a conflict between the two; Frank-
furter, J., concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 355:
"A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary,
nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy
over the other; both are indispensable to a free society."
6. But see Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 97, 98 (1947), expressing the
view that such a result is not only possible, but has been achieved.
7. 314 U.S. 252 (1941), 159 A.L.R. 1346, 1379 (1945). In that case,
a labor leader sent A telegram to the Secretary of Labor, stating
that a decision in a suit between the AFL and the CIO was
"outrageous," and that the CIO did not intend to let the state
court override its wishes in the matter. He later caused to be
published, or acquiesced in the publication, of a copy of the tele-
gram. He was convicted of contempt. Held, reversed. In the
companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v. Calif., the alleged contempt
consisted of an editorial entitled "Probation for Gorillas?" which
ended "Judge Scott will make a serious mistake if he grants
probation to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes. Tis com-
munity needs the example of their assignment to the jute mill."
8. The phrase is derived from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919), a case involving a prose-
cution for seditious writings.
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high."" The decision, however, seems to leave little room for
such a situation to exist. Though this is by no means a nec-
essarily undesirable result, one should not overlook the pos-
sibility that the present construction of Justice Holmes' phrase
has, for all practical purposes, put an end to punishment for
contempt by publication.1o
Secondly, it is a quantitative problem, in that the policy
judgment finally reached must be based upon the relative
amounts of evil which one expects from a limitation upon
either a free press or an uninfluenced trial. It may be ar-
gued that the free press, in publishing blow-by-blow reports
of trials, is catering only to idle and gossiping tongues. But
to this, one might counter that the effect of publications upon
the actual outcome of litigation has been vastly exaggerated,
and that the few cases actually influenced are greatly out-
numbered by the instances in which the public good demands
free expression of opinion regarding matters of widespread
interest. It is submitted that the argument based on the
public good is a most cogent one, and seems to express the
attitude of the majority of the Court today. Still, it is not
entirely satisfactory, since the possibility remains that in
some few cases it may leave an individual-perhaps in a cap-
ital case-to the quicksands of the abhorrent "trial by news-
paper."
Blackstone, commenting upon the power to punish for
contempt, including contempts by publication, spoke of the
"inherence" and "necessity" of the power.11 His position
has been traced to an undelivered opinion in a case which
never went to final decision. 2 Though this would not appear
9. Bridges v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
10. The majority opinion in the instant case does not say that there
are no facts which could possibly constitute a "clear and present
danger." But in view of the language used by the Court in defin-
ing such a danger, it is difficult tQ imagine a situation involving
an out-of-court publication which would meet the standards im-
posed: "The vehemence of the language used is not alone the
measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which
it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat
to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote
or even probable; it must immediately imperil." 331 U.S. 367.
11. 4 Comm.* 284, et seq.
12. King v. Almon, Wilmot, Notes and Opinions of Judgments, 243(1765). The case is thoroughly reviewed by Sir John Fox, "The
King v. Almon", 24 L. Q. Rev. 184, 266 (1908), in an article refuting
the inherence and necessity of the power, as well as Blackstone's
notions of ancient usage. The same conclusions were reached by
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to be the sturdiest possible foundation for so recurrent a doc-
trine, the concept found favor in England, and today remains
firmly entrenched there. 3 Printed matter which tends to
defeat the administration of an impartial justice is speedily
punished,"' and the application of the power has, in England,
been found to be both feasible and popular. Complaints of
hardship by the press have been few.'5
In America, a different attitude has prevailed from the
beginning. Three major obstacles faced proponents of the
power: (1) Establishment of the proposition that the power
was an integral part of the common law of England at the
time that body of law was adopted in this country. There is
little evidence to show that the development of the power
had taken place before 1765, the date of the decision in King
v. Almon, the case upon which Blackstone's opinion of the
power is said to be based."' (2) Even if the doctrine had
been accepted in England at an earlier date, it was argued,
one of the basic ends of the Revolution was escape from the
onerous English restrictions of freedom of expression, and
that consequently it had never been intended that such a pow-
er be imputed to the American courts.17 (3) Statutory re-
strictions on the power were quickly passed, and the courts
were faced with the problem of avoiding the limitations im-
posed or submitting to them.
Pennsylvania was the first American jurisdiction to
encounter the problem. In Respublica v. Oswald,18 an editor
was summarily punished for contempt in commenting upon
a pending case, and for a time public dissatisfaction with the
existence of the power was widespread. An abortive attempt
was made to impose a statutory limitation, but after a time,
excitement died down. It was not until feelings were once
Nelles and King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States,"
28 Col. L. Rev. 401, 408, 548 (1928).
13. Goodhart, "Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law,"
48 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1935).
14. Sullivan, "Contempts by Publication" 5 (1941). The author states
that punishment for cotempts "scandalizing the courts" by out-
of-court publications has been abandoned in England, but that
those tending to defeat the administration of an impartial justice
are quickly censured.
15. Goodhart, supra n. 13, at 909.
16. Supra n. 12.
17. Black, J., speaking for the Court in Bridges v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252,
264 (1941).
18. 1 Dall. 319 (U.S. 1788).
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again aroused by a similar case 9 that a limiting statute was
passed, which rigidly circumscribed the extent of the con-
tempt power in that state.20
New York met a similar problem a short time after
passage of the Pennsylvania act.21 Legislative action was
delayed, however, since public opinion was quieted when
DeWitt Clinton,22 arguing the case for the defendant, secured
a reversal of the contempt conviction. It was not until al-
most twenty years later that a restrictive act was passed,
and even then, it was not as confining as the Pennsylvania
act.23  It has been widely copied in other jurisdictions.2'
19. Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 441 (Pa. 1802). The very
interesting civil suit in the same matter is Bayard and Petit v.
Passmore, 3 Yeates 439 (Pa. 1802).
20. Pa. Acts, 1808-09, c. 78, p. 146. This was a temporary provision,
which was renewed from time to time until made permanent
by the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, §§ 23 et seq. It is still
law in Pennsylvania today. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17
§§ 2044, 2045. § 2044 reads, "No publication, out of court, re-
specting the conduct of the judges, officers of the court, jurors,
witnesses, parties or any of them, of, in or concerning any cause
depending in such court, shall be construed into a contempt of
the said court, so as to render the author, printer, publisher, or
either of them, liable to attachment and summary punishment for
the same."
§ 2045 reads, "If any such publication shall improperly tend to
bias the minds of the public, or of the court, the officers, jurors,
witnesses or any of them, on a question depending before the
court, it shall be lawful for any person who shall feel himself ag-
grieved thereby to proceed against the author, printer and pub-
lisher thereof, or either of them, by indictment, or he may bring
an action at law against them, or either of them, and recover such
damages as a jury may think fit to award."
21. Case of J.V.N. Yates, 4 Johns. 316 (N.Y. 1809). The case did not
involve contempt by publication, but practice of law by a master
in chancery. Nonetheless, it aroused the same animosity toward
the contempt power as did the Pennsylvania cases.
22. New York lawyer and statesman, governor of New York 1816 to
1822. For a short biography, see 4 Dict. Am. Biog. 221.
23. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Pt. iii, c. iii, tit. 2, art. 1, § 10. The pro-
visions relating to contempt by publication are, with minor amend-
ments, found today in N.Y. Judiciary Law § 750; Penal Law § 600.
Respectively, the provisions read:
§ 750. "A court of record has power to punish for a criminal
contempt, a person guilty of either of the following acts, and no
others: * * *
"6. Publication of a false, or grossly inaccurate report of
its proceedings. But a court cannot punish as a contempt, the
publication of a true, full, and fair report of a trial, argument,
decision, or other proceeding therein."§ 600. "A person who commits a contempt of court, of any one
of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor: * * *
"7. Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its
proceedings. But no person can be punished as provided in this
1948] NoTEs
The problem did not arise in the federal courts until
1831.25 An editor published a biased and incorrect statement
of a decision of Judge Peck, a federal judge sitting in Mis-
souri. Later, the editor was attached for contempt. Almost
immediately, impeachment proceedings were begun against
Judge Peck, and his defense was narrowly successful. The
day following the termination of the proceedings in impeach-
ment, a bill in Congress was introduced and passed, rewording
the provisions of the original Judiciary Act of 1789,26 and
section, for publishing a true, full, and fair report of a trial,
argument, decision, or other proceeding had in court."
24. According to Nelles and King, supra n. 12, nineteen states have
enacted statutes similar to that of New York, ten states follow
the type statute passed by Congress in 1831, five others follow
the federal statute as enacted in 1789, and the remaining states
have no such statutes in effect.
The relevant Indiana statute dates from 1879, and is found
today in Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 3-905. It provides punish-
ment by contempt for persons who "falsely make, utter or pub-
lish any false or grossly inaccurate report of any case, trial, or
proceeding" provided such publication is made between the time
the proceeding was commenced and its final disposition.
On the general problem, see Comment, "Civil and Criminal
Contempts in Indiana," 8 Ind. L. J. 497 (1932). Several important
cases have arisen in Indiana, but in none of them was the con-
stitutional issue raised.
The leading case is Kilgallen v. State, 192 Ind. 531, 132 N.E.
682 (1922), which sustained a conviction for contempt by pub-
lication for comment upon a pending case. The matter alleged
to be contemptuous consisted of an editorial which charged that
the grand jury had corruptly allowed a defendant in a criminal
case to conduct a "defense" before them during the course of
their investigation. Rehearing was denied, 192 Ind. 696, 137 N.E.
178 (1922), on the grounds that the constitutional issue could not
be raised for the first time on appeal.
The rule of the Kilgallen case was extended in Shumaker v.
State, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N.E. 769 (1928). In that case, it was
held that threats of political reprisals against the judges of the
Supreme Court because of their previous disposition of a class of
cases, viz., prohibition cases, were sufficient to uphold a conviction
for contempt when it was shown that the intent was to influence
the outcome of all subsequent cases of the class, though there
was no reference to a particular case then pending. The case
has been subject to the severest criticism in at least ten law re-
view articles, without having once been cited in a subsequent case.
See Note, 3 Ind. L. J. 149 (1928). In the light of present con-
stitutional doctrines, it seems apparent that the decision could
not stand.
25. Stansbury, "The Trial of James H. Peck" (1833); Nelles and King,
supra n. 12, at 423.
26. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83, c. 20. The pertinent section
provided that the United States courts "shall have power . . . to
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts,
all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the
same."
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adding a proviso "That such power to punish contempts shall
not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehav-
ior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice. '' 27
In spite of the historical background of the 1831 Act,2 1
Chief Justice White found it possible, in Toledo Newspaper
v. United States,29 to say that that act "conferred no power
not already granted and imposed no limitations not already
existing,"30 but that the statute was merely "declaratory" of
existing law. Certainly this construction would have been
most astounding to the authors of the bill. The approach illus-
trates one of the two principal devices which have been used
to avoid the effect of restrictive acts in this field. The other
method has been the more forthright declaration that the
power to punish for contempt-any contempt-is. inherent
in the courts, or as some have said, "superstatutory" or even
"superconstitutional."' 31 Further, the Chief Justice found
that the "so near thereto" clause required only a "reasonable
tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about the
baleful result" of interference with the administration of
justice.82 Justice Holmes dissented vigorously, finding noth-
ing in the facts to show that a judge would be influenced by
them, and that "a judge of the United States is expected to
be a man of ordinary firmness of character." 3
27. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487, § 1. Reenacted without change
in the Judicial Code as § 268, and now appears in 28 U.S.C. § 385
(1940). Interpretation of the italicized phrase has been the sub-
ject of much litigation.
28. Supra n. 27.
29. 247 U.S. 402 (1918). In that case, a daily newspaper was attached
by summary proceeding for criminal contempt. The alleged con-
tempt was the publication of matter advocating public refusal
to abide by an injunction issued in litigation over street-railway
fares, and in reporting the speech of a certain Socialist who had
suggested "Impeach Killits" (the judge).
30. Id. at 418.
31. Nelles and King, supra n. 12 at 554. The article contains an ap-
pendix giving a comprehensive list of pertinent state statutes,
together with reported cases construing them and a statement of the
theory underlying the power over contempts, whether through
avoidance or lack of statutes. These are given as (1) common
law powers, (2) statutory powers, (3) superstatutory and super-
constitutional inherent powers, (4) construction of limiting statutes
as "declaraory," (5) strict construction of limiting statutes, and
(6) avowed adherence to the federal rulings.
32. 247 U.S.- 402, 421 (1918).
33. 247 U.S. 402, 424 (1918). It would seem, however, that the main
force of the dissent was directed toward the summary nature of
the proceedings.
NoTEs
Twenty-three years later, in Nye v. United States,34 the
Court overruled the Toledo case. Referring to the legislative
history of the problem, the majority found that the Act of
183135 was obviously intended to impose a limitation on the
power to attach for contempt. The problem of whether or
not a "reasonable tendency" to produce the substantive evil
of interference with the administration of justice was suf-
ficient ground for contempt was settled by construing the
"so near thereto" clause to be geographical, involving only
physical proximity to the court, rather than a question of
causation.3 6
It was not until the case of Bridges v. California,37 in
1941, that the "clear and present danger" requirement' re-
placed the "reasonable tendency" rule of the Toledo case, as
applied to interference with the administration of justice by
offending publications. It was there made clear that only
immediate and unmistakable threats to a fair trial could be
considered a contempt of court. In a strongly worded dissent,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter3 8 expressed the opinion that the
power to punish for contempt was of the greatest importance,
and vital to the very preservation of free speech and a free
press, since only by protection of impartial trial could the
courts safeguard the other civil rights.39  The minority also
34. 313 U.S. 33 (1940). In the Nye case, a suit was instituted against
defendants, makers of a headache remedy, for the wrongful death
of plaintiff's son. Defendants caused certain letters to be written,
requesting the judge and attorneys to dismiss the suit, and pro-
cured the plaintiff, an ignorant and illiterate man, to sign them.
No payment was made or promised to plaintiff. Defendants were
attached for contempt in the lower court. Held, conviction reversed.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1940).
36. Mr. Justice Stone, in his dissenting opinion, wholly disagreed with
this construction. "This court has hitherto, without a dissenting
voice, regarded the phrase 'so near thereto' as connoting and in-
cluding those contempts which are the proximate cause of actual
obstruction to the administration of justice, whether because of
their physical nearness to the court or because of a chain of caus-
ation whose operation in producing the obstruction depends on
other than geographical relationships to the court." 313 U.S. 33,
54 (1940).
37. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
38. Speaking for the four man minority, composed of Stone, C. J., and
Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Roberts, JJ.
39. That the courts have no other means to ensure the orderly ad-
ministration of justice is far from apparent. At least two states
are. able to maintain a functioning judiciary without recourse to
the power. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17, §2044; Ky. Rev.
Stat. (Cullen, 1944), §432.240. The argument of the minority in
19481
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defended the "reasonable tendency" position taken in the
Toledo case, and dismissed the argument over whether "clear
and present danger" or "reasonable tendency" should be the
test by saying, in effect, that both phrases connoted roughly
the same thing, viz., that a "rule of reason" should be ap-
plied.40  But as has been pointed out by subsequent com-
ment, certainly the flavor of the two phrases is different.4'
In Pennekamp v. Florida,42 the "clear and present dan-
ger" test was reaffirmed as the criterion for judging contempt
vel non. There was no dissent as to the result, but three
justices wrote separate concurrences, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
finding that the publications did not in fact show a "reason-
able tendency" to defeat the orderly administration of jus-
tice, especially since it was not clear that the published ar-
ticles related to a pending action.43
Several other factors are important in the field of con-
tempt by publication. Intent of the publisher to commit a
contempt has occasionally been held relevant, though more
frequently not.4 Truth of the published matter is never a
defense, either in England or America.45  Nor is knowledge
the Bridges case, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941), is worded in part:
"Free speech is not so absolute or irrational a conception as to
imply paralysis of the means for effective protection of all the
freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights . . . The Bill of Rights
is not self-destructive."
40. 314 U.S. 252, 296 (1941). "The phrase itself (i.e., clear and
present danger) is an expression of tendency and not of accom-
plishment, and the literary difference between it and reasonable
tendency is not of constitutional dimension." Hanson, "The Su-
preme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publica-
tion," 27 Cornell L. Q. 165, 180 (1942), ridicules this statement.
41. Note, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 97, 99 (1946).
42. 328 U.S..331 (1946), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 97 (1946), 25 Tex. L. Rev.
173 (1946), and 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 222 (1946). Mr. Hanson,
author of the article cited supra, n. 40, appeared as counsel for
the publisher.
43. In the Pennekamp case, supra n. 42, certain indictments were
found to be defective, and were dismissed. Though new indict-
ments were filed before the publication of the allegedly offensive
materials, the comment was made upon the prior action of the
court in dismissing the original indictments, no mention being
made of the pending actions.
44. Sullivan, "Contempts by Publication" 38 (1941), and cases there
cited.
45. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Skipworth's and Cas-
tro's Case, L.R. 9 Q.B. 230 (1873).
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by the publisher of the fact of publication,4 though bona fide
ignorance may be given in mitigation of punishmentY7
It appears immaterial what effect the publication in fact
has upon the litigation conmented upon. The objective stand-
ard of the ordinarily firm judge has been generally accepted
without question. 8 This seems to be the only practical ap-
proach. To give relevance to the effect on the particular
litigation would necessitate, as a condition precedent to con-
tempt proceedings, an admission by the judge that he had
allowed himself to be influenced by the published material.
Few men are either so brave or so candid, and such a require-
ment would be futile. Though the point is not clear, the dis-
senting justices in Craig v. Harney appear to disagree with
the majority principally as to how much firmness the ordinary
judge is expected to exhibit, rather than as to whether the
effect on the particular judge should be considered .4
The present case seems to be little more than a reinforce-
ment of the previous position of the Court, except insofar as it
indicates that in few, if any, cases would the Court consider
that an out-of-court publication constituted a "clear and pres-
ent danger" to the administration of justice by an ordinarily
46. Killgallen v. State, 192 Ind. 531, 132 N.E. 682 (1922); Roach v.
Garvan, 2 Atk. 469 (Ch. 1742); Sullivan, op. cit. supra n. 44, at
39; Goodhart, supra n. 13, at 907.
47. People v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 Pac 167 (1893) ; Sullivan, op.
cit. supra n. 44, at 39; Goodhart, supra n. 13, at 907.
48. But see Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33,
54 (1940), supra n. 34, which seems to indicate that actual effect
upon the litigation has been previously held material.
49. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting separately in the instant case,
said: "I do not know whether it is the view of the Court that ajudge must be thick-skinned or just thick-headed, but nothing
in my experience confirms the idea that he is insensitive to pub-
licity."
It is a bit remarkable that most of the writings directed
toward a limitation of the power to attach for contempt by publica-
tion persist in treating the problem solely as one of effect upon
the judge, and exercise of the power as a mere vindication of
his position. Those who, like Sullivan, argue in favor of a broad
contempt power emphasize rather the influence which contuma-
cious publications may have upon those called for jury service
in the trial. The argument is especially strong in criminal cases
in which identification is a major issue, as Sullivan points out.
The possibility of adverse effect upon jury and witnesses is prob-
ably much more likely than any swaying of the judge, yet such
effect is so ethereal and difficult to trace that few cases have
grounded a contempt upon the former. At any rate, both sides
might legitimately be accused of concentrating upon their own
positive arguments, and failing to answer the perfectly valid con-
tentions of the other.
19481
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
firm judge. But though the cases decided would indicate
such an attitude, it must be admitted that in no case to date
has the Court been faced with a combination of all the pos-
sible factors which would indicate that gross and inexcusable
influence on the administration of justice was certain to re-
sult. It is interesting to speculate as to which if any of th
following factors influence the Court in its determination of
"clear and present danger": (1) whether the action comment-
ed upon is a civil or criminal proceeding, and if criminal,
whether the punishment upon conviction is of a severe na-
ture ;51 (2) whether the case is commented upon during the
course of the trial itself, or while the case is pending only in
a technical sense;512 (3) whether the subject-matter of the
case is of widespread public concern, e.g., a labor dispute, or
just run-of-the-mill litigation ;53 (4) whether the publication
clearly attempts to influence the outcome of the particular
case, or simply purports to offer the publisher's viewof it; 54
(5) whether the printed material encourages and incites to
extralegal methods,1 or merely seeks to influence through legal
channels by shaping public opinion, etc.56 In each of the cases
herein discussed, one or more of these factors was missing
or appeared in the aspect least favorable to exercise of the
contempt power. It is at least a logical inference that the
Court intends that all of these factors-and possibly others,
since this short list by no means exhausts the available dis-
tinctions-shall be present and clearly indicative that there
is an immediate and pressing probability that the life or free-
dom of a person will be jeopardized, before it will feel free
to find a "clear and present danger" to the administration
of justice.
Should it be decided, in the light of the foregoing his-
tory and rationale, that there is a place in American juris-
50. See supra n. 10.
51. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) and Times-Mirror Co.
v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252 (1941), both involved comment upon pend-
ing criminal actions.
52. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
53. In Bridges v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Court discusses this
distinction, but finds little merit in it.
54. Times-Mirror Co. v. Calif., 314 U.S. 252 (1941), supra n. 7. "Judge
Scott will make a serious mistake . . . . "
55. Toledo Newspaper v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402 (1918), supra n. 29.
56. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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prudence for such a contempt power, the objection remains
that the power as it has been exercised in the United States
is an invitation to a biased trial of the contempt, due to the
summary nature of the proceedings. The solution seems to
require only that the contempt power be saved from abuse,
and not that it be abolished. England, which originally pro-
ceeded by way of indictment and jury trial for contempt,
abandoned that procedure early in the nineteenth century,
in favor of a summary proceeding before a divisional court.
The judge who was the object of the publication does not sit.
The solution has been agreeable.57 In some American juris-
dictions, provision has been made for the appointment of a
special judge or at least a different judge to try the con-
tempt.58
Such steps may contain at least a partial answer. If
the power to punish for contempt for out-of-court publica-
tions is to continue at all, certainly an attempt should be made
to guarantee an impartial trial of the contempt proceeding.
The present construction of the phrase "clear and pres-
ent danger" amounts to a virtual exclusion of contempt by
publication from the law, as can be seen from a factual ex-
amination of the cases in point which have been decided in
the past ten years.5  If this is a desirable result-and there
is very strong argument that it is-still, it has been reached
by a somewhat circuitous method. The phrase has been
stretched so as to exclude fact-situations which many persons
would consider to present a clear and present danger to
the administration of unbiased justice. It is submitted that
limitations on the contempt power are properly a subject for
legislation. Regulatory legislation would in a large measure
relieve the courts of the unfortunate task of policing them-
selves in this aspect of the contempt field. Further, it would
solidify and make more certain the ground for future de-
cisions.
57. Goodhar, supra n. 13, at 909. But see the dictum of Holmes,
J., dissenting in Toledo Newspaper v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402, 423(1918), to the effect that indictment is the usual mode of pro-
ceeding in England.
58. Ind. Acts 1931, c. 26, §1, p. 62, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§3-911 (appointment of special judge); Mich. Comp. Laws (Ma-
son's Supp., 1940) §13910 (judge of another court of record);
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, c. 146, § 21a (demand for another judge
limited to cases in which judge has been personally attacked as
to character or conduct).
59. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. U.S., 314
U.S. 252 (1941); Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33 (1940).
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